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Medieval Trolls, Mansplainers, and Bullies: 
Reading Gontier Col’s Letters to Christine de Pizan 
Through the Lens of Twenty-First-Century 
Online Feminist Activism
Elizabeth A. Hubble
in 2015, i wrOtE an articLE about using gender-based violence pre-
vention bystander intervention techniques as an effective theoretical lens 
through which to read and teach patristic and medieval misogyny in the 
humanities classroom.
1
 Because of the effectiveness of that approach, my 
background in violence prevention has become a “way of knowing” that 
now informs all of my research and pedagogy.
2
 As I prepared to teach an 
advanced undergraduate/graduate course on Medieval and Early Modern 
Women Authors in Spring of 2017, I kept finding medieval echoes of 
issues that feminists are addressing in twenty-first-century cyberspace. 
This article explores one of those echoes; in particular, the ways in 
which the fifteenth-century French humanist Gontier Col participates 
in what today’s feminists (and others) term “mansplaining,” “trolling,” 
and “bullying” in his 1401 letters to the medieval author Christine de 
Pizan. I further argue that such echoes provide important insights into 
how male privilege and the authority to speak intersect in the Middle 
Ages and today. Finally—and most importantly—these insights can 
be used to engage students, researchers, and activists in the classroom 
and beyond.
1. Elizabeth A. Hubble, “Bringing the Bystander into the Humanities 
Classroom: Reading Ancient, Patristic, and Medieval Texts on the 
Continuum of Violence,” Teaching Rape in the Medieval Literature Classroom: 
Approaches to Difficult Texts (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Press, 
forthcoming). 
2. I direct the Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program at the 
University of Montana-Missoula, and I am the former co-chair of the UM 
University Council on Student Assault and a trained advocate. 
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Mansplaining: A Modern Phenomenon?
In Fall 2016, a story about a Twitter exchange between a NASA astronaut 
(Dr. Jessica Meir) and a man whose Twitter handle is @CaseyOQuin 
went viral. Meir had tweeted, “My first venture >63,000’, the space 
equivalent zone, where water spontaneously boils! Luckily I’m suited!” 
@CaseyOQuin replied, “Wouldn’t say it’s spontaneous. The pressure 
in the room got below the vapor pressure of the water at room temp. 
Simple thermo.”
3
 An ensuing exchange between @CatherineHaines and 
@Ceilidhann summed up Meir’s experience:
@CatherineHaines: @paulcoxon @Ceilidhann I just real-
ized something. She’s an astronaut and he went to space camp 
(according to his profile). Wow
@Ceilidhann: @CatherineHaines @paulcoxon What’s the line 
again about women needing to be twice as qualified to get half 
the credit?
4
In other words, Meir had been mansplained. Merriam Webster’s website 
has a great definition of “mansplaining” as “what occurs when a man 
talks condescendingly to someone (especially a woman) about some-
thing he has incomplete knowledge of, with the mistaken assumption 
that he knows more about it than the person he’s talking to does.”
5
 @
CaseyOQuin’s tweet fulfills all of those requirements, especially his ready 
assumption that he knows more than Meir.
The term “mansplaining” is credited to Rebecca Solnit and her 
3. Mark Pygas, “This Guy Tried to ‘Mansplain’ Space to a Female NASA 
Astronaut, and It Didn’t Go Well,” Distractify, 9 September 2016, http://
distractify.com/trending/2016/09/09/mansplain-space-astronaut, accessed 5 
February 2017. @CaseyOQuin’s actual tweet is hard to find because he 
deleted his Twitter account during the backlash, but there are screen shots. 
4. Pygas, “This Guy Tried to ‘Mansplain’ Space to a Female NASA 
Astronaut.” 
5. “Words We’re Watching: Mansplaining,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/mansplaining-definition-
history, accessed 5 February 2017. 
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2008 essay “Men Explain Things to Me.” In 2010, the New York Times 
included it as one of their “words of the year.”
6
 Solnit does not actually 
use the term herself, but her essay resonated with women, especially 
among academics.
7
 In her essay, Solnit offers several examples of the 
most egregious “mansplaining” she has experienced in her professional 
life and states, “But explaining men still assume I am, in some sort of 
obscene impregnation metaphor, an empty vessel to be filled with their 
wisdom and knowledge.”
8
 Solnit ends the 2014 postscript to her 2008 
essay by stating: “Having the right to show up and speak are basic to 
survival, to dignity, and to liberty. I’m grateful that, after an early life 
of being silenced, sometimes violently, I grew up to have a voice, cir-
cumstances that will always bind me to the rights of the voiceless.”
9
 She 
contends that mansplaining “is one way that, in polite discourse, power 
is expressed—the same power that in impolite discourse and in physi-
cal acts of intimidation and violence, and very often in how the world 
is organized—silences and erases and annihilates women, as equals, as 
participants, as human beings with rights, and far too often as living 
beings.”
10
 Solnit’s insight—that mansplaining is connected to power 
and the authority to speak—is key to understanding this phenomenon 
today and throughout history. 
Gontier Col: Medieval Mansplainer
I was reminded of Meir’s experience and Solnit’s analysis when I was 
rereading Gontier Col’s letters (dated 13 and 15 September 1401) to Chris-
tine de Pizan, in which he calls her out for her audacity in offering an 
“invective” against the thirteenth-century medieval bestseller Le Roman 
de la rose, begun by Guillaume de Lorris and continued (at great length) 
by Jean de Meun (who is accorded primary author status by Col and 
6. Rebecca Solnit, “Men Explain Things to Me,” Men Explain Things to 
Me (Chicago, IL: Haymarket Press, 2014), 12–13. 
7. See the tumblr “Academic Men Explain Things to Me” at http://
mansplained.tumblr.com/.






 These letters are part of what is now known as “The 
Debate” or “Quarrel of the Rose.” I started to ponder the ways in which 
it appeared (to me, at least) that Col was participating in “mansplain-
ing” as defined above. Col was one of King Charles VI’s secretaries and 
an early French humanist, and his first letter’s ostensible purpose was to 
request a copy of Christine’s critique of his colleague Jean de Montreuil’s 
treatise on Le Roman de la rose in which Christine condemns the obscen-
ity and misogyny of Le Roman.12 Col follows standard medieval letter-
writing conventions by addressing the letter to the “prudent, honoree 
et sçavent demoiselle Cristine, Femme de hault et eslevé entendement, 
digne d’onneur et recommandacions grans” (To the wise, honorable, and 
learned Lady Christine, Woman of high intelligence, worthy of honor 
and high praise).
13
 However, the rest of the letter almost forces the reader 
to see that opening as irony because he goes on to say:
Et comme dient les relateurs ou referandaires de ceste chose, 
t’efforces et estudies de le reprendre et chargier de faultes en ta 
dicte œvre nouvelle: laquelle chose me vient a grant amiracion et 
merveille inestimable, et a ce non croire me meut l’experience et 
exercite de toy d’avoir sceu, leu et entendu lui ou dit livre et en 




(And, as I was told by those who recounted these matters to me, 
in your new work you attempt to contradict him [de Meun] and 
to accuse him of errors. I am very much astonished by this because 
from what I have heard about you, I cannot believe that you have 
read and understood this book or his other works in French, nor 
those written by several other masters, authors, and poets.)
11. Debating the Roman de la rose: A Critical Anthology, ed. Christine 
McWebb (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 114. 
12. Please note: I am referring to Col by his last name and Christine by 
her first because of the changing nature of last names in late medieval France. 
“de Pizan” is simply a reference to Christine’s place of birth in Italy, rather 
than an actual last name. 
13. Debating, 114. I am using Christine McWebb’s translations. I note 
where I have made changes based on my own reading of the Middle French. 
14. Ibid. 
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In short, Col tells Christine, “I can’t believe you actually understood 
Le Roman de la rose so let me set you straight.” 
Col’s assumption that he knows more than Christine is profound, 
and he fulfills another aspect of the Miriam-Webster definition of mans-
plaining completely: “he has incomplete knowledge,” because, as he 
himself states, he has not actually read her treatise. Thus, the primary 
purpose of this letter is not to refute her arguments. I am also not con-
vinced that his purpose is to procure a copy of her work to analyze and 
refute. Rather, it is to assert his (and Jean de Meun’s) “authority” by 
informing Christine de Pizan (a well-read, educated, literate woman) of 
something that she just does not seem to get—that the primary author 
of Le Roman de la rose, Jean de Meun, was a master (maistre in Col’s 
words), and she has no business questioning him. The term “authority” 
(or, rather, its Latin equivalent auctoritas) is a loaded one in medieval 
studies, and in both Meir’s and Christine’s experiences, their mansplain-
ers are convinced of their own “authority” to correct a woman’s assumed 
“ignorance and errors.” 
In the political climate of early 2017, the nature of authority is again 
at issue. As I wrote this article, I reflected deeply on what I meant by 
that term. Ultimately, I am defining “authority” in this article as “status 
conferred on someone based on their privilege.” A person with privilege 
can also assume authority based on that privilege. Following Peggy 
McIntosh’s classic article, I define “privilege” as “an invisible package 
of unearned assets that a person can count on cashing in each day, but 
about which they are ‘meant’ to remain oblivious.”
15
My definition of “authority” differs in some important ways from 
the medieval understanding of the Latin term auctoritas, which is the 
origin of our modern English term. In particular, the medieval concept 
of auctoritas is connected to authorship in ways that twenty-first-century 
understandings of authority are not. Part of the theoretical work I put 
into this article was teasing out what that distinction was, and how a 
15. Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack,” 
1988, https://www.csusm.edu/sjs/documents/UnpackingTheKnapsack.pdf, 
accessed 11 February 2017. This essay and various versions of it are widely 
available, under this title and others.
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medieval writer like Gontier Col negotiated his own understanding and 
deployment of auctoritas, authority, and privilege. Ultimately, I hope to 
demonstrate that Col’s claims of auctoritas are predicated not on learning 
or expertise but on nothing more than unearned male privilege and the 
authority it confers.
A. J. Minnis’s book The Medieval Theory of Authorship explores the 
ways in which medieval writers constructed their notions of authorship 
through their understanding and deployment of auctoritas.16 Minnis 
argues that we cannot unproblematically apply modern literary the-
ory concepts to medieval texts. Rather, we must acknowledge that the 
sophisticated thinkers of the Middle Ages had their own version of liter-
ary theory that was “centered on the concepts of auctor and auctoritas.”17 
Minnis states, “the work of an auctor was a book worth reading; a book 
worth reading had to be the work of an auctor. No ‘modern’ writer could 
decently be called an auctor in a period in which men saw themselves 
as dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants, i.e. the ‘ancients’.”
18
 This 
definition means that neither Col nor Christine could be considered 
auctores, and their writings cannot be accorded auctoritas. 
Today, the word “author” has been (at least somewhat) semanti-
cally separated from the etymologically-related term “authority,” but in 
medieval literary theory “[t]he auctor remained an authority, someone 
to be believed and imitated.”
19
 Minnis goes on to argue, “In a literary 
context, the term auctor denoted someone who was at once a writer and 
an authority, someone not merely to be read but also to be respected 
and believed.”
20
 Col’s defense of Jean de Meun fits Minnis’s definition 
nicely. However, that Jean de Meun or any literary/vernacular writer had 
auctoritas was not a given. As Minnis explains, the expansion of what an 
auctor was only comes with “the changing attitudes to literature which 
16. A. J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988). 
17. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship, 1.
18. Ibid., 12.
19. Ibid., 5. 
20. Ibid., 10. Throughout this article, I am being careful to distinguish 
between my use of the word “writer” and my use of the word “author.” 
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characterise [sic] the later Middle Ages.”
21
 Minnis actually uses Jean de 
Meun as an example of that expansion in his final chapter. However, 
Minnis contends that de Meun is not an auctor but rather a compilator: 
“The greatest medieval compilation of auctoritates on love is perhaps 
Jean de Meun’s Roman de la Rose.”22 Col’s bestowing of auctoritas on de 
Meun demonstrates that by the early fifteenth century, de Meun has 
gone from a compilator of auctoritates to an auctor in his own right, at 
least in the eyes of his “disciples” who wish to use his auctoritas to estab-
lish their own. Minnis does not explicitly discuss the gendered aspects 
of auctoritas. However, a close reading of Col’s letters (and Christine’s 
response) illuminates Col’s gendered understanding of auctoritas and 
thus provides parallels to twenty-first-century understandings of male 
privilege and how that privilege confers authority, if not auctoritas.
My students are always shocked to realize that Col has not actually 
read what Christine wrote, but that he is nevertheless sure that she 
is wrong. For Col, because she is not a docteur, aucteur, or poete, she 
IS wrong, no matter what she wrote. From the twenty-first-century 
perspective of my students, Christine was both an aucteur and poete, 
if not a docteur, underlining Minnis’s argument about the medieval 
understanding of auctoritas as not something that was simply gained by 
writing. Christine’s writings do rely on auctores and auctoritates, but that 
does not a priori confer either authority or auctoritas. From a medieval 
perspective, she is not an auctor. Moreover, from Col’s perspective, she 
does not have access to authority or auctoritas. My students often wonder 
if he would be so sure of that if she were not a woman. 
In other words, is it possible to argue that he is rejecting her writings 
based on medieval literary theory rather than her gender? For example, 
Col uses the adjective “nouvelle” to describe her writings.
23
 As Minnis 
demonstrates, new writings are not considered sources of auctoritas. Col 
further implies that he knows the people who are able to understand an 
auctor and his auctoritas. And, because he has only “heard” about her, 
she is not part of that group. His peers are the people who have access to 




a university education, thus connecting his argument against Christine’s 
writings to “education-based privilege” rather than explicitly to gender. 
Christine has not attended university and is not one of Col’s colleagues, 
therefore Col can claim an authority to speak that Christine cannot. But 
are these arguments about the novelty and marginality of Christine’s 
writings truly separate from her gender? In the Middle Ages, formal 
education was closed to women, so Christine’s outsider status is ulti-
mately predicated on her lack of unearned male privilege, as defined by 
McIntosh. Thus, even an argument that does not appear to be explicitly 
based in gender is actually all about gender privilege. 
This connection to education-based privilege is therefore where Col 
reveals his prejudice against her gender. His prejudice is made explicit 
when he expresses doubt that she is the source of her writings but posits 
that she is being used as “chappe a pluye pour dire que plus y sauroi-
ent que une femme et plus reprimer la renommee indeficient entre les 
mortelx d’un tel homme” (a buffer, so that they may say they knew more 
about this than a woman, further tarnishing the unjustified ill reputation 
of such a man [Jean de Meun]).
24
 In other words, the male slanderers 
of de Meun hope that Col and his allies will criticize Christine instead 
of focusing on them—the real (read: male) threat to de Meun’s legacy. 
In her essay “Men Explain Things to Me,” Solnit begins with the 
anecdote that inspired her to reflect on the phenomenon of men explain-
ing things to women who are experts in the area being explained. As she 
recounts, she was trying to leave a 2003 party in Aspen, Colorado, when 
the host, “an imposing man who’d made a lot of money,” asked her to 
stay so he could talk to her. He said to her, “So? I hear you’ve written 
a couple of books.” Solnit was, at that time, the author of six or seven 
books. She shared that her most recent book was River of Shadows: Ead-
weard Muybridge and the Technological Wild West. Her host interrupted 
her to say “And have you heard about the very important Muybridge 
book that came out this year?” 
So caught up was I in my assigned role as ingénue that I was 
perfectly willing to entertain the possibility that another book on 
the same subject had come out simultaneously and I’d somehow 
24. Debating, 114–16. 
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missed it. He was already telling me about the very important 
book—with that smug look I know so well in a man holding forth, 
eyes fixed on the fuzzy far horizon of his own authority [emphasis 
mine]. Mr. Very Important was going on smugly about this book 
I should have known when [Solnit’s friend] interrupted him to say, 
“That’s her book.” Or tried to interrupt him anyway. . . . She had 
to say, “That’s her book” three or four times before he finally took 
it in. . . . That I was indeed the author of the very important book 
it turned out he hadn’t read, just read about in the New York Times 
Book Review a few months earlier.25 
There is a striking similarity here to what Col accuses Christine of—that 
she is not actually the “brains” of her writings. Even though he has not 
read them, Col suspects that she is a pawn of learned (yet wrong) men. 
In Solnit’s case, we also have a man erasing Solnit’s writings in order 
to expound on his own authority about a book he also has not actually 
read, not able to imagine that the book (about the same subject as her 
book) is by her. Thus, male interlocutors position Solnit and Christine 
a priori as inferior writers to imagined male authors.
Solnit’s experience parallels that of NASA astronaut Jessica Meir and 
Christine de Pizan, and all three epitomize “mansplaining.” In all three 
cases, a man assumes that a given woman cannot possibly understand 
or have full knowledge of x, y, or z, and it is incumbent upon him to 
mansplain it to her. By virtue of their unearned male privilege, Sol-
nit’s host, @CaseyOQuin, and Gontier Col feel authorized to speak as 
authorities on subjects about which they are not experts. Col’s authority 
rests on his male privilege, which also allows him access to another axis 
of privilege—education. In his worldview, his authority supersedes his 
ignorance of Christine’s actual treatise. Solnit’s host’s privilege is likewise 
based in his gender and also in his socio-economic status, both of which 
allow him to assume an authority that supersedes his ignorance of who 
actually wrote the unread but New York Times Book Review-authorized 
text to which he refers. @CaseyOQuin’s privilege appears to be founded 
solely on his gender; that is the epitome of mansplaining: unearned 
25. Solnit, “Men Explain Things to Me,” 1-3. 
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male privilege confers a belief in one’s authority to speak in and control 
public spaces. And if assertions of authority through mansplaining are 
not enough to silence these learned women, other tactics will need to 
be deployed, as Col demonstrates. 
Col the Gendertroll
When Christine refuses to be silenced and retract her criticism of Le 
Roman de la rose, Gontier shoots back (within one or two days—his first 
letter is dated 13 September 1401, and the second 15 September 1401) with 
a letter that drips with condescension, anger, irritation, and impatience. 
He begins by literally preaching to her in a passage that draws from the 
Gospel of Matthew, and he ends his introductory “sermon” with either 
a copying or intentional mistake, saying that if a friend (gendered male 
by Col) refuses to retract his errors, one must consider him “tanquam 
eunucus et publicanus,” (as though a eunuch and publican) from Mat-
thew 18:17—which actually reads “sicut ethnicus et publican” (as a hea-
then and publican/tax collector).
26
 
Col’s new tactics to silence Christine parallel, in important ways, the 
tactics used by Internet trolls to silence women and other marginalized 
voices. In Gendertrolling: How Misogyny Went Viral, Karla Mantilla 
defines trolling as “making online comments or engaging in behaviors 
that are purposefully meant to be annoying or disruptive. . . . The 
behavior is committed with the express purpose of tweaking, upset-
ting, or enraging others.”
27
 Mantilla’s book goes beyond what she terms 
generic trolling to explore gendertrolling, which her in-depth inter-
views and case studies demonstrate is “precipitated by women asserting 
their opinions online.”
28
 Thus, the goal of gendertrolling is to silence 
women in online spaces and to punish those who refuse to be silenced. 
That goal matches Col’s aim of silencing Christine and forcing her to 
26. Debating, 134. Col’s version therefore becomes a bizarre mistake/
intentional sexualization of this passage. 
27. Karla Mantilla, Gendertrolling: How Misogyny Went Viral (Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 4. 
28. Ibid., 12. 
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acknowledge de Meun’s auctoritas (and Col’s own authority). Like Col, 
when some men are confronted with the threat of a woman with a voice, 
they become gendertrolls and respond with ad hominem attacks, explicit 
(yet flawed) appeals to a quite medieval understanding of auctoritas, 
anger, and violence.
Between Col’s first and second letter, Christine forwarded him her 
treatise. Once he has it, he has two choices: 1) acknowledge it; or 2) put 
it under erasure. He chooses the latter. Thus, rather than using his sec-
ond letter to refute particular points of her argument, Col abandons any 
pretense of debating Christine’s ideas in order to deploy an ad hominem 
attack on Christine as a woman, not as a thinker. He states:
Et je te aime loyaument pour tes vertus et merites, t’ay premiere-
ment par une mienne lettre, que avant yer t’envoyay, exortée, avisée 
et priée de toy corriger et amender de l’erreur et magnifeste folie ou 
demence trop grant a toy venue par presompcion ou oultrecuidance 
et comme femme pacionnée en ceste matiere—ne te desplaise se je 
dy voir.
29
(Since I love you loyally for your virtues and merits, I sent you, the 
day before yesterday, a first letter in which I begged, exhorted, and 
advised you to retract your error and manifest foolishness or lunacy 
which was caused by your presumption or conceit
30
 as a woman 
passionate about this matter—be not angered with me for speaking 
the truth.)
Here Col begins to directly attack her gender with his references to 
potential mental instability and to her immoderate emotion. He fur-
ther uses the term “voir” (truth) to refer to his argument.
31
 But there is 
no “truth” in his letter. He provides no facts or arguments that refute 
Christine’s work. The truth to which Col appears to be referring is that 
Christine is a foolish woman who will not acknowledge that he and de 
29. Debating, 134. 
30. McWebb’s translation combines “presompcion ou oultrecuidance” as 
“pretentiousness.” I have separated the words back out. 
31. Ibid.
100
Meun have the right to irreproachable auctoritas, something from which 
Christine is excluded, not because of her ideas but because of her gender.
In fact, Col cannot acknowledge her ideas because if he does, he has 
already lost. His argument is not with her writings but with her viola-
tion of gendered norms. If he admits that her arguments are debatable, 
he will have allowed her entry into the masculine space where learned 
ideas are exchanged. Christine’s status as a woman is the location of the 
threat, not her arguments. Writing is a masculine pursuit (as Christine 
herself notes in her work “La Mutacion de fortune,” see below). Col 
is threatening Christine for attempting to enter that masculine space 
where male privilege confers authority and, Col seems desperately to 
hope, auctoritas. His only option is an ad hominem attack that allows 
him to ignore her learning.
This aspect of the exchange of letters between Christine and Gontier 
Col again recalls twenty-first-century examples of “trolling.” Witness 
what happened when astrophysicist Katherine J. Mack took to Twitter 
to express her concern about climate change.
32
 A Twitter user named 
Gary P. Jackson replied, “Maybe you should learn some actual SCIENCE 
then, and stop listening to the criminals pushing the #GlobalWarming 
SCAM!” Mack replied “@gary4205 I dunno, man, I already went and 
got a PhD in astrophysics. Seems like more than that would be overkill 
at this point.” Jackson doubled down and replied, “Then you should 
ask for a refund because they failed to teach you the most basics [sic] 
of science.”
33
 Jackson’s rejection of Mack’s degree as authoritative is not 
necessarily tied to gender, but the connection can be supported by the 
similarities to the experiences of Meir, Solnit, and Christine. 
Jackson’s reply reveals that authority and expertise are not synony-
mous. In today’s world, two things that prove someone’s expertise are 
32. Chris York, “Astrophysicist Dr Katherine J Mack Destroys Climate 
Change Sceptic Troll,” Huffington Post UK, http://www.huffingtonpost.
co.uk/entry/astrophysicist-twitter-trolls_uk_57b2c60de4b02fb3274b64ad, 
accessed 28 January 2017. 
33. Laura Bates, “Mansplaining: How not to Talk to Female Nasa 
Astronauts,” Guardian.com, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/
womens-blog/2016/sep/13/mansplaining-how-not-talk-female-nasa-astro-
nauts, accessed 28 January 2017.
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advanced degrees and citations of one’s work. Mack, Meir, and Solnit 
have those markers of expertise, which should lead to a public recogni-
tion of their authority, but when it intersects with their less-privileged 
gender, that assumption of authority is compromised, similarly to what 
is seen in the exchange between Christine and Col. Expertise is con-
nected to earned advantages, not unearned privilege. Gary Jackson’s 
erasure of Mack’s education demonstrates that authority supersedes 
expertise in public spaces like the internet and is unquestionably con-
nected to male privilege. Mack’s gender intersects with her expertise, 
and the gendered axis allows Jackson to erase/deny her education as 
authoritative. For Col, Christine’s gender functions in much the same 
way. Christine’s learning poses a threat to Col’s male privilege, to his 
ability to assume authority, and to any hope that he might someday be 
considered an auctor, and that scares him. 
Thus, Col (like all gendertrolls)
34
 reveals that he is motivated by fear, 
something that he underscores with his next tactic. As a result of his 
fear, Col runs to hide behind the institutions that maintain his privi-
lege and her oppression. To that end, he falls back on the Bible as his 
ultimate source of auctoritas. Col’s invocation of “la Sainte Escripture” at 
the beginning of his second letter demonstrates his reliance on medieval 
notions of auctoritas—because Christine obviously did not accept that 
Jean de Meun is an auctoritas (as Col argued in his first letter), he will 
alter his “argument” to emphasize the Bible rather than de Meun’s mas-
tery of theology as he did in his first letter. As Minnis argues, it is not 
a given that a writer working in the vernacular (like Jean de Meun) can 
be called an auctor. Therefore, Col is at pains to emphasize de Meun’s 
mastery of the greatest source of auctoritas: the Bible. In his second 
letter, Col states that de Meun was a “tres excellant et inreprehensible 
docteur en saincte divine Escripture, hault philosophe et en toutes les 
.vii. ars liberaulx clerc tres parfond” (very
35
 excellent and irrefutable 
34. A generic troll may be motivated solely by their own entertainment in 
causing anger. However, as Mantilla demonstrates, gendertrolls are driven by 
misogyny and regularly take their attacks beyond generic trolling, thus 
revealing their fear and anger.
35. McWebb’s translation does not include the word “very” for “tres,” but 
I think Col’s overblown rhetoric demands it. 
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master of Holy Scripture, renowned philosopher, and expert in all seven 
liberal arts).
36
 Thus, de Meun’s auctoritas is a product of his mastery 
of the “saincte divine Escripture,” and therefore, it is above critique 
(irreprehensible). Col and de Meun are both protected from criticism 
by a monolithic deployment of biblical auctoritas; that is, an attack on 
them is an attack on God. 
Religion and the Bible are still institutions used to maintain privilege 
and confer authority. Today, internet trolls may rely less on the Bible 
than a medieval author did (depending on the debate), but they do 
use a quite medieval notion of auctoritas to maintain their privileged 
positions in public spaces, such as the internet. Internet trolls find that 
auctoritas by relying on and hiding behind a misapplication/intentional 
misunderstanding of the First Amendment to the US Constitution: by 
claiming they are just exercising their right to free speech. The Consti-
tution thus functions as their monolithic conferrer of auctoritas. One 
of the best examples of this “hiding behind the First Amendment” is 
notorious troll Milo Yiannopoulos, whose debate at the University of 
Manchester in 2015 was entitled “From Liberation to Censorship: Does 
Modern Feminism Have a Problem with Free Speech?”
37
 Yiannopoulos 
and his followers regularly assert his right to verbally attack women (and 
others) under the cover of the First Amendment. For example, when 
Yiannopoulos was banned from Twitter for his attacks on actress Leslie 
Jones, @scrowder tweeted, “Good lord, Twitter will never get it. An 
anti-free speech communication platform will lose its value.”
38
 
In her Pace Law Review article “Abuse and Harassment Diminish 
Free Speech,” legal scholar Anita Bernstein argues that claims of “free 
speech” by trolls are actually examples of censorship wherein the only 
36. Debating, 134. 
37. Anonymous, “The White Knights of the First Amendment,” Ms. 
Magazine Blog, http://msmagazine.com/blog/2016/09/14/the-white-
knights-of-the-first-amendment/, accessed 11 February 2017.
38. Elle Hunt, “Milo Yiannopoulos, Rightwing Writer, Permanently 
Banned from Twitter,” Guardian.com, https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/jul/20/milo-yiannopoulos-nero-permanently-banned-
twitter, accessed 12 February 2017. Yiannopoulos is one of a handful of 
internet trolls permanently banned from Twitter. 
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voices allowed in the public space that is the internet are those that do 
not question the status quo of straight, white, male privilege.
39
 More-
over, the author [Anonymous] of “The White Knights of the First 
Amendment” argues, we only need ask who benefits from these First 
Amendment claims to see that the purpose is anything but protecting 
people’s free speech. Anonymous cites legal scholars Alice Marwick 
and Russ Miller who write, “Research suggests that those most likely 
to be victims of hateful, online speech are women, sexual minorities, 
and people of color. In other words, harassment breaks down along 
traditional lines of power.”
40
 Thus, Anonymous argues, “the current 
defense of the First Amendment is not a defense of open conversation 
and free speech—it is a defense of harassment and a defense of those 
who wish to wield inflammatory rhetoric elevating white supremacy, 
misogyny and homophobia without consequence or criticism.” That 
is exactly what Col is doing—relying on the Bible to silence a woman 
who criticizes the misogyny of Jean de Meun. The fact that today’s First 
Amendment defenders’ arguments so closely parallel Col’s pre-modern, 
pre-Enlightenment arguments are further proof that free speech is any-
thing but the goal of those defenders. The goal, is, rather, to maintain 
the systems of privilege that confer male authority by hiding behind 
medieval understandings of auctoritas that allow trolls to label texts such 
as the Bible and the US Constitution as above question.   
When ad hominem attacks and claims of a higher auctoritas do not 
have the desired effect, gendertrolls respond with threats of violence 
and anger. Col participates in this escalation of silencing tactics when 
he states that he is still willing to take “pitié de” Christine and grant her 
“penitence salutaire” if she retracts her words publicly.
41
 Through his 
use of the word “salutaire,” he appears to be both accusing her of sin 
39. Anita Bernstein, “Abuse and Harassment Diminish Free Speech,” Pace 
Law Review 35, no. 1 (Fall 2014): 1–30. 
40. Alice Marwick and Ross Miller, “Online Harassment, Defamation, 
and Hateful Speech: A Primer of the Legal Landscape,” Fordham Center on 
Law and Information Policy Report No. 2, Center on Law and Information 
Policy at Fordham Law School, 10 June 2014, 5, https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2447904. 
41. Debating, 134. 
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and then giving himself (as a cleric) the ability to forgive her sin. And 
what is her sin? Questioning his authority and de Meun’s/the Bible’s 
auctoritas. In declaring her a sinner, Col is echoing another biblical pas-
sage: “I permit no woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she 
is to keep silent” (1 Timothy 2:12). Therefore, Col posits, Christine is 
in violation of God’s word and must publicly repent. 
Col continues on to state that if she does not retract her treatise, as 
one of de Meun’s “vrays et loyaux disciples” (true and loyal disciples), he 
will be forced (“avant que je me mette en peine d’escripre”) to denounce 
her in writing.
42
 He ends this letter by invoking God and by informing 
her that “ce soit dommage se plus demouroies en tel erreur soubz les 
tenebres d’ignorence” (It would be a shame is you remained any longer 
in the darkness of error and ignorance).
43
 Ultimately, he is threatening 
her with damnation if she does not stop attacking de Meun’s (read: 
Col’s) auctoritas. 
Thus, Col’s efforts to silence Christine parallel the constant abuse 
that online feminists experience from internet trolls. Col’s and the trolls’ 
ultimate goal is to silence women (and other marginalized groups) who 
threaten their privilege to be the authorities on whatever topic arises. 
Women entering public spaces force (some) men to question their own 
privilege, and that reveals the constructed nature of their authority, 
thus threatening it with deconstruction. In short, if only Christine 
would shut up, Col would not have to question his own privilege and 
“right” to authority. Therefore, he must threaten her to protect his 
status. Similarly, online feminist journalist Lindy West’s articles about 
anything feminist-related force members of the hegemony to face those 
voices that disagree with them. Therefore, West must also be silenced, 
censored, and/or erased. Internet trolls (and scholastic/textual trolls like 
Col) work to prove to women, and thus, to themselves, that women do 
not belong in public spaces. 
I first became familiar with West in February 2015 through an article 
she wrote entitled “What Happened When I Confronted my Cruellest 
42. “Disciples” is an interesting word choice that places de Meun in the 
position of Jesus and Col in the position of a disciple.
43. Ibid., 134.
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[sic] Troll.” In that article, she wrote: “Sometimes the hate trickles 
in slowly, just one or two messages a day. But other times, when I’ve 
written something particularly controversial (ie feminist)—like, say, my 
critique of men feeling entitled to women’s time and attention, or liter-
ally anything about rape—the harassment comes in a deluge. It floods 
my Twitter feed, my Facebook page, my email, so fast that I can’t even 
keep up (not that I want to).”
44
 
Her piece echoes Bernstein’s legal argument, and also illuminates 
the “true” motivation behind Col’s attacks on Christine. West contin-
ues on to write: “And even ‘innocuous’ harassment, when it’s coming 
at you en masse from hundreds or even thousands of users a day, stops 
feeling innocuous very quickly. It’s a silencing tactic. The message is: 
you are outnumbered. The message is: we’ll stop when you’re gone. . . . 
Who gets trolled has a direct impact on who gets to talk; in my per-
sonal experience, the fiercest trolling has come from traditionally white, 
male-dominated communities (comedy, video games, atheism) whose 
members would like to keep it that way.”
45
 Col very much wants to 
silence Christine and maintain the status quo. And, while he does not 
deploy threats of sexual violence or murder, he does threaten her with 
a medieval equivalent: God’s damnation.
West notes that often the police (the authorities?!) participate in this 
silencing when they recommend that women simply get off the internet, 
as if that was a possibility for someone like West, whose profession is 
online journalism. As Bernstein argues: “The recipient of abuse who 
leaves the Internet because she finds conditions there intolerable neces-
sarily experiences displacement. She forfeits a conduit of communica-
tion. She loses social and professional gains that she would have enjoyed 
absent abuse and harassment. Ceteris paribus she writes less, learns less, 
teaches less, holds less power.”
46
 In fact, on January 3, 2017, Lindy 
West announced, “I’ve left Twitter. It is unusable for anyone but trolls, 
44. Lindy West, “What Happened When I Confronted my Cruellest 
Troll,” Guardian.com, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/feb/02/
what-happened-confronted-cruellest-troll-lindy-west, accessed 4 February 
2017. 
45. Ibid. 




 About her Twitter departure, West states, “The 
breaking point for me wasn’t the trolls themselves—it was the global 
repercussions of Twitter’s refusal to stop them.” West did not leave the 
internet, just Twitter, but her departure is exactly what Bernstein is 
demonstrating in her article—that by not regulating the violence of 
their users, Twitter (and its tacitly authorized trolls) diminished West’s 
free speech, and erased her from one public space. 
Similarly, Col is demanding that Christine emulate West’s depar-
ture from public discourse. Christine MUST leave the public space of 
educated discourse and apologize for having entered it in the first place. 
For Col, as for West’s trolls, her words do not exclude her from the 
public space: her gender does, because it cannot be allowed to confer 
any authority to speak publicly, as Christine herself acknowledges in her 
1402/03 poem “La Mutacion de fortune” wherein she writes:
Mais, pour mieulx donner a entendre
La fin du proces ou veuil tendre,
Vous diray qui je suis, qui parle,
Qui de femelle devins masle
Par Fortune, qu’ainsy le voult.
48
 
(But, to better make understood the end of the process that I 
want to tell, I will tell you who I am, who is speaking, and how I,      
a female, became a male, because Fortune wanted it thus.)
This poem, notably begun within a year of her exchange of letters with 
Col, evidences her awareness of gender constructions and how her gender 
worked to prevent her from undertaking a writing career to support her 
family after the deaths of her father and husband. In order to write, she 
“becomes male”: she undertakes a masculine pursuit. She might have 
47. Lindy West, “I’ve left Twitter. It is Unusable for Anyone but Trolls, 
Robots and Dictators,” Guardian.com, https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2017/jan/03/ive-left-twitter-unusable-anyone-but-trolls-
robots-dictators-lindy-west, accessed 4 February 2017. 
48. Christine de Pisan, Le Livre de la mutacion de fortune, ed. Suzanne 
Solente (Paris: Picard, 1959), lines 139-43. Translation my own. 
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learned this lesson as a result, at least in part, of her treatment at the 
hands of Col, whose threats against her were never about her intelligence 
or writing.
49
 Ultimately, as all gendertrolls demonstrate, Col reveals 
himself to be not an auctoritas, but to be nothing more than a bully 
relying on his unearned male privilege to assume authority. 
BINGO: Gontier Col Masters “Bully Bingo”
Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a bully as “a blustering, browbeat-
ing person; especially: one who is habitually cruel, insulting, or threat-
ening to others who are weaker, smaller, or in some way vulnerable.” 
When I first proposed this article, one of the editors of this collection 
asked if I was familiar with an article entitled “Bully Bingo: 52 Signs 
Someone Will Say Anything to Win an Argument.”
50
 As I read through 
it, I was shocked by how many of those fifty-two signs Col deploys in 
his two short letters. Four of the fifty-two stand out, but he is guilty 
of many of them:
#2: Little or no admission of their subjectivity.
Col presents himself as the neutral purveyor of unbiased “truth.” He says 
so himself: “ne te desplaise se je dy voir” (be not angered with me for 
speaking the truth).
51
 Col’s real truth, however, is that he is in a position 
of privilege wherefrom his opinion is supposed to be accepted by all as 
unbiased fact, and Christine (in her person and in her writing) cannot 
be allowed to challenge his “truth.” 
In this same passage, Col is constructing a “straw man” argument 
in which he predicts that Christine will be upset by him speaking the 
49. It is significant that Christine started writing, at least in part, to 
support her family after the deaths of her father and husband. Thus, Col’s 
attempts to drive her from that public space have implications for her living, 
as Bernstein notes. 
50. Jeremy Sherman, “Bully Bingo: 52 Signs Someone Will Say Anything 
to Win an Argument,” Alternet.org, http://www.alternet.org/personal-
health/how-tell-someone-will-say-anything-win-argument, accessed 4 
February 2017. 
51. Debating, 134. 
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“truth.” That then gives him a false pretense to dismiss her because she’s 
too emotional (something of which he has no evidence), which connects 
to #8 on the Bully Bingo list:
#8: “Because you’re upset, you’re wrong.” 
Col’s “straw man” argument relies on sexist stereotypes, and thus func-
tions to reveal his actual problem: she’s a woman, and, therefore, what-
ever she writes is a priori dismissable:
#30 “I don’t have to consider your opinion 
because you’re one of those!”
Col has placed Christine in the category of “dismissable fools,” as 
evidenced when he accuses her of “folie.”
52
 
And, finally, “Bully Bingo” includes a modern take on auctoritas 
(renamed here as my new favorite term “Toga-cred”):
#21 “I must be right because I’m quoting someone ancient.” 
(AKA Toga-cred).
Col is also guilty of #1 Playing Judge; #18 Playing Interrogator; #19 
Throwing their books at you; #20 “A lot of people agree with me so I 
must be right”; #35 Insistent reply; #46 Reiteration as reasoning; and 
#48 “You’re a biased ideologue; I’m a neutral observer”; and potentially 
others. Through his bullying tactics, Col allies himself with today’s 
gendertrolls thus revealing his true purpose: maintaining his position 
of privilege which allows him to assume authority and confer auctoritas 
on his maistre, if not himself. 
Christine Replies
When I teach these letters, students are always quick to point out Col’s 
flaws. For example, that Col is obviously emotional as he writes his 
second letter, and yet it is Christine whom he accuses of being immod-
erately emotional—his ad hominem attack has become an ad hominem 
tu quoque attack. Students are buoyed by Christine’s late September 1401 
52. Ibid.
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response to Col’s letters, in which she reveals that she is well aware of 
his bullying attacks:
Et pour vouloir emplir ton bon mandement le t’ay envoye; par 
quoy, aprés la veue et visitacion d’icellui, comme ton erreur pointe 
et touchee de verité, meu de impacience m’as escript tes .ii.ème 
lettres plus injurieuses reprochant mon femenin sexe.
53
 
(In response to your kind request, I sent you a copy of this treatise, 
which, after you had read it thoroughly, led you to write me, with 
impatience, a second letter, in which you commit a poignant error 
removed from the truth by reproaching my female sex.
54
)
Christine’s rhetorical savvy and intelligence are on great display here 
as she ironically states that, since she sent Col her treatise, of course, 
he has studied it. The juxtaposition of “visitacion d’icellui” and 
“impacience” are markers that Christine recognizes that Col is not 
interested in the content of her work—his quick reply reveals that he 
has had little time to study her work. 
She reads his threats against her (that she is like Matthew’s publican 
and destined to live in the shadows) as just what they are—signs of his 
own emotionality and lack of neutrality: 
[N]e seuffres a propre voulenté tenir close la soubtilleté de ton 
engin! Regardes droit selon voye theologienne la plus souveraine 
et tut ant ne condampneras mes dis ainsi comme les ay escrips, et 
considereras se louange affiert es pas particuliers que ilz reppren-
nent; et toutesfoiz bien soit de toy notté en toutes pars quieulx 
choses je condampne et quelles non.
55
 
53. Debating, 136. Christine uses the term “sexe” to refer to Col’s attacks 
on her. In this article, I use the term “gender” to refer to Christine’s expres-
sion of her interface with the sex/gender binary. It is her performance of 
masculinity and violation of feminine norms that are being questioned, not 
her biological sex. Christine would not have made that distinction between 
sex and gender, one that remains difficult even in the modern French 
language because of the double meaning of the word “genre.” 
54. McWebb’s translation includes the reference to her feminine sex in the 
next sentence. I have replaced it in its original position. 
55. Ibid. 
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(Do not let your own willfulness blunt the cleverness of your mind! 
Look straight down the path of holy theology and you will not 
condemn my writings thus. Instead you will judge whether praise 
is truly appropriate for those parts of the Roman which my writ-
ings address. In any case, it would be good of you to note precisely 
which parts I condemn and which ones I do not.)
She continues to force the issue of what his actual problem is—her 
writings or her “sexe,” or, perhaps, “the content of her writings” ver-
sus “the mere fact of her writing.” She calls him out for attacking her 
“veritable oppinion justement meue pour tant se elle n’est a ta plaisance” 
(my truthful opinion simply because it is not to your liking).
56
 Taking 
a prophetic page from how to play “Bully Bingo,” Christine sees Col’s 
claims to Truth as what they are: him pretending “to have a pure objec-
tive perspective” wherein “anyone who disagrees with them is biased” 
or wrong (see #2 and #48). However, it must be noted that Col is not 
necessarily claiming neutrality but superiority. His claim is to an author-
ity that Christine can never access, ostensibly based on the auctoritas of 
the Bible and the biblical maistre Jean de Meun, but actually based on 
Col’s and Christine’s respective genders.
57
 
She continues to deconstruct his attacks when she writes, “Si ne 
cuides aucunement moy estre meue ne desmeue par legiereté, par quoy 
soye tost desdite” (If you think I am just motivated by fickleness, why 
are you so annoyed?).
58
 By engaging in this dialogue with Christine 
and becoming angry, Col has paradoxically revealed that her ideas do 
have merit and that she is worthy of respect. If she was just a “femme 
pacionnée” whose “folie ou demence” drove her to write such ignorant 
words, Col would not be driven to respond, and his response would not 
evidence his anger and fear. 
Throughout her response, Christine is clear that she wishes to have 
her ideas be the subject of the debate, not her identity. However, both 
56. Ibid.
57. In this same passage, Christine posits that Col’s understanding of the 
Bible is obscured by his emotions—a quite pointed critique on her part. 
58. Ibid., 138. 
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here and in her 1405 Book of the City of Ladies, she demonstrates that she 
is well aware that she cannot expect that or rely on her own intelligence 
and learning to win any argument. For example, in her letter to Col, in 
order to bolster her argument, she refers to “un soubtil clerc docteur” 
(a learned cleric) who agrees with her.
59
 Her careful negotiation of the 
intersection of her gender with her learning is apparent in many parts 
of her body of work. As bell hooks will argue in her 1984 book Feminist 
Theory: From Margin to Center, Christine’s self-awareness speaks to her 
location on the margins of society, a location that conversely provides 
her with a more nuanced understanding of how that society works.
60
 
Col cannot be expected to interrogate a privilege that he sees as natural 
or God-given or “voir.” Christine, however, who lacks that socially 
constructed gender privilege, can interrogate it as she gains the skills 
the scholarly class has (education) but cannot access the concomitant 
privilege that is actually unearned because it is a result of gender-based 
privilege. 
Moreover, she demonstrates an understanding of the flawed argu-
ments of these men who rely on unearned male privilege to assume 
authority and to attempt to claim auctoritas. She writes in the first sec-
tion of The Book of the City of Ladies:
Mais la veue d’icelluy dit livre, tout soit il de nulle auttorité, ot 
engendré en moy nouvelle penssee qui fist naistre en mon couraige 
grant admiracion, penssant quelle puet estre la cause, ne dont ce 
puet venir, que tant de divers hommes, clercs et autres, ont esté, et 
sont, sy enclins a dire de bouche et en leur traittiez et escrips tant 
de diableries et de vituperes de femmes et de leurs condicions. En 
nom mie seulement un ou deux ne cestuy Matheolus, qui entre les 
livres n’a aucune reputacion et qui traitte en maniere de trufferie* 
maie generaument aucques en tous traittiez philosophes, pou-
ettes, tous orateurs desquelz les noms seroit longue chose, semble 
que tous parlent par une meismes bouche et tous accordent une 
59. Ibid., 136. She also references this unnamed cleric in her treatise to 
Jean de Montreuil as “l’especial clerc soubtil,” 118. 
60. bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (Cambridge, 
MA: South End Press, 1984). 
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semblable conclusion, determinant les meurs feminins enclins et 
plains de tous les vices.
61
(But the sight of this book, although it was of no authority, made 
me think along new lines which made me wonder about the 
reasons why so many different men, learned and nonlearned, have 
been and are so ready to say and write in their treatises so many evil 
and reproachful things about women and their behavior. And not 
just one or two, and not just this Matheolus, who has no particular 
reputation and writes in a mocking manner, but more generally it 
seems that in all treatises philosophers, poets, and orators, whose 
names it would take too long to enumerate, all speak with the same 
mouth and all arrive at the same conclusion: that women’s ways are 
inclined to and full of all possible vices.)
62
 
Here Christine is calling out men like Jean de Meun and Gontier Col, 
and many, many others who are considered auctores, by noting that 
their arguments are no different from those of “nulle auttorité” like 
the little book of Matheolus. Le Roman de la rose is not the work of a 
learned master, but just the repetition of a long history of misogyny 
deployed to maintain male privilege. The arguments of de Meun and 
Col are no different from those of Matheolus, and no different from 
those of twenty-first-century gendertrolls, no matter how much biblical 
auctoritas Col hides behind. 
Christine positions herself as coming from a place of traditional 
auctoritas—learned reading of those who came before her—but demon-
strates that that reading takes her to new ways of thinking (bell hook’s 
argument—that her marginalized gender provides additional auctoritas 
rather than diminishing it). I believe that much more can be said about 
how Christine confronts male privilege and the authority it confers 
and then moves on to construct a woman-centered form of auctoritas 
61. Christine de Pizan, The ‘Livre de la cite des dames’ of Christine de Pizan: 
a Critical Edition, ed. Maureen Cheney Curnow (PhD diss., Vanderbilt 
University, 1975), 617–18. 
62. Translation by Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski and Kevin Brownlee from 
The Selected Writings of Christine de Pizan. (New York, NY: Norton, 1997), 
119. 
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through her curation of the letters of the debate which she herself com-
piles and organizes to present to the French Queen Isabeau of Bavaria 
and then in The Book of the City of Ladies. Col’s reliance on an unques-
tioned auctoritas of learned men (cleres) whose ideas do not differ from 
unlearned men (autres) leads away from the actual truth Christine offers 
the Queen of France in her prefatory letter (“comme de verité meue,” 
[motivated by the truth]).
63
 Part of the truth that Christine offers is to 
shed light on the coercive, constructed nature of patriarchy that relies 
on its “cleres and autres” to diminish women “qui n’est choise loisible a 
souffrir ne soustenir” (which is a thing not to be tolerated or sustained).
64
 
Christine recognizes that Col’s purpose, like that of Matheolus and like 
gendertrolls today, is to maintain male privilege and the authority to 
control public discourse and spaces.
Ultimately, that is why Col refuses to engage with Christine’s argu-
ments. He is attempting to sustain his privilege, to use Christine’s word. 
In order to do so, he employs tactics that parallel those used today by 
mansplainers, trolls, and bullies. The realization of these similarities 
has not disheartened me in the face of millennia of misogyny. Rather, 
it has provided me with an increased understanding of the coercive 
nature of patriarchy: if patriarchy was inevitable, it would not have to 
rely on violence to maintain itself. In addition, reading Col’s tactics and 
Christine’s responses through the lens of twenty-first-century online 
feminist interventions has given me another way to connect students 
with these texts by helping them see that, by refusing to be silenced, we 
can dismantle patriarchal institutions and spaces, stone by stone, to use 
Christine de Pizan’s metaphor in The Book of the City of Ladies. 
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